As the war that began between the US and Iran on February 28, 2026, continued, one month later—on March 28—the Janfada Iran People’s Headquarters launched the “Janfada” (Janfada-yi Iran) campaign. It announced the establishment of 1,000 new resistance battalions with the participation of 1 million volunteers, and that volunteer registration would begin. Web portals, SMS channels, telephone lines, and registration centers were set up across Iran to enlist individuals aged 12 and older into this mobilization.
Starting September 15, calls for volunteer registration for the Janfada battalions began to be issued. Billboards inviting citizens to join the campaign were placed in cities throughout Iran; it was announced that volunteers would be provided with military training as well as first aid and search-and-rescue training. Promotional visuals featured Kalashnikov assault rifles, sniper rifles, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), navigation devices, and diving equipment, asking viewers whether they knew how to use them. What initially appeared as a simple online registration platform was rapidly transformed in September into an aggressive, highly visible nationwide campaign for military training and civil mobilization.
It was an interesting development that this system—which emerged during a period when the war with the US was raging fiercely and an American ground invasion was on the agenda, yet remained passive—was activated precisely at the beginning of September when the end of the war was being discussed.
According to a statement made by Sasan Zare, Spokesperson for the Janfada Campaign, 31 million people had registered in the system, with the following demographic breakdown: 68% male, 32% female, and more than 60% under the age of 46. Of those registered, 26% declared that they were prepared to take direct part in active combat, military, and security operations.
The organizational infrastructure and the training of volunteers were conducted by the Basij organization, which is directly affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). To ensure unity around regime ideology, the Basij turned neighborhood-level mosques and local cultural centers into military bases. Media reports indicated that as of September 15, 2026, Basij commanders began providing registered volunteers at mosques and military centers with comprehensive training, including light weapons assembly, marksmanship, first aid, and search-and-rescue. Training on “ensuring security, surveillance, control, and intelligence measures” also stood out prominently in the volunteers’ curriculum.
Three days after official registrations opened, on September 18, a massive military parade and public exercise was held in the capital, Tehran. It brought together Basij units, Janfada-yi Iran volunteers, and other participants, with a reported attendance of 313,000 people. President Masoud Pezeshkian also attended the event. Speaking at the ceremony, Hossein Taeb, head of the Basij Organization, described the Janfada initiative as the “popularization of defense and security,” stating that this community was a symbol of Iran’s progress and the country’s republican character. Taeb noted that the campaign would expand beyond Tehran to other regions of Iran, expressing that “tens of millions” of citizens were ready to volunteer.[i]
At a time when the American military had removed a ground invasion of Iran from its agenda—an invasion that was geographically impossible to begin with—and when talks of ending the war in the coming days were circulating, the acceleration of this mobilization, the swift arming and military training of registered volunteers, and thousands of them demonstrating in public squares armed with weapons was striking.
Why was this necessary?
Organizations like FactNameh that investigated the matter noted that it was mathematically and technically impossible for 31 million people—representing over 30% of Iran’s current population (approximately 90 million)—to register for this mobilization, asserting that the number was inflated.[ii] According to their data, it was impossible for the number of people accessing and registering in the system to exceed 4 million.
Analysts argue that rather than a military mobilization, this campaign is a propaganda effort designed both to create a psychological deterrent against the outside world and to present an illusion of “absolute loyalty to the regime” to the domestic public.
On the other hand, the fact that the Janfada battalions are managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and utilize the Basij paramilitar network for organization and training reinforces the claim that these armed volunteers are structured as a tool to strengthen the regime’s capacity to intimidate and control domestic opposition. Indeed, Basij militants have long been known for their harsh stance in crushing street movements by the opposition.
The Regime’s Fear: New Uprisings
It will be recalled that prior to the US-Iran war, following the crash of the Iranian rial against the US dollar to a historic low of nearly 1.4–1.5 million rials per dollar, shopkeepers in Tehran closed their stores on December 28, 2025, initiating protests that were soon joined by ordinary citizens. In January 2026, the protests spread to over 200 cities, turning into one of the largest anti-regime popular movements seen since the 1979 Revolution. Following harsh crackdowns on protesters by the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), police, and Basij militia, the Iranian Presidential Security Council reported 3,117 fatalities, with tens of thousands detained. Western and US media claimed the death toll ranged between 12,000 and 30,000. More than 130 police officers, Basij members, and IRGC personnel lost their lives in attacks carried out by anti-government groups and armed protesters targeting police vehicles, IRGC stations, and Basij bases. By the second half of January, the regime regained control, and mass street demonstrations were halted.
The US attack on Iran in February 2026 and the killing of top-level leaders during the strikes, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, halted anti-regime demonstrations and altered the direction of the actions, turning public reactions into nationalist reflexes that prioritized national defense.
The regime’s greatest fear is the possibility of protests re-emerging once the war ends. Although external threats fostered internal solidarity, the public will face the cold realities of daily life once the conflict terminates. The economic hardships that triggered protests and clashes prior to the war, far from improving, have been further exacerbated by the conflict. The total cost of the 7-month war to the Iranian economy is estimated to be around 270–300 billion dollars. While annual inflation in Iran stood at 50.8% in 2025, it reached nearly 89% annually in 2026; as of August 2026, 1 US dollar surpassed the 2,000,000 rials (200,000 tomans) threshold on the open market.
The surge in Iran’s military expenditure—taking up 145–200% more of the budget—and the redirection of resources to the defense budget have paralyzed the civilian economy. World Bank and IMF reports project that the Iranian economy will contract by 6.1% in 2026. To meet rising military expenses, state subsidies on food, medicine, and fuel were removed; development/infrastructure budgets for roads, dams, and urban projects were cut; and taxes were raised to close the budget deficit. The civilian manufacturing sector fell into a severe production crisis due to the prioritization of fuel and electricity for military facilities and the defense industry over industrial and transport sectors. Oil revenues declined significantly owing to blockades in the Strait of Hormuz, refinery damage, and maritime shipping risks. In short, the burden of the war was directly reflected in the public’s purchasing power.
Economic, financial, commercial, and political sanctions put into effect against Iran by the United Nations (UN), the US, the European Union (EU), and various countries are further compounding the economy and the living conditions of the population. As these embargoes impoverish the Iranian public, the IRGC—through its implementation of the “Economy of Resistance”—has transformed into a massive informal economic empire that eliminates competition, erases transparency, and monopolizes illicit trade networks. There has been no improvement in this unregulated system that enriches IRGC executives at the expense of public outrage; instead, it continues to erode civilian capital day by day.
It is clear that the economic crisis, suppressed during the war by nationalist sentiments and security bureaucracy, will become the public’s number-one issue once the conflict ends.
The Public’s Issue with the Regime Is Not Just Economic
Mojtaba Khamenei, who was elected to the position of Vali-e Faqih (Supreme Leader), was injured in the February 28 US attack in which his father was killed and has not been seen in public since. The Revolutionary Guards have filled the power vacuum left by the absence of the highest authority. The resulting uncertainty over how state decisions are made has raised suspicions that decisions are not being taken by Mojtaba Khamenei, but by a tight IRGC junta surrounding him. Suspicions that the Supreme Leader’s authority has been effectively seized in this manner are spreading, particularly among military ranks.
Deep ideological differences and a power struggle between the Hawks (IRGC Military Wing) and the Technocrats and Pragmatists (Civilian Wing) within Iran became evident during negotiations with the US. The hawkish faction within the IRGC, which achieved success against the US in the war, is using its success to consolidate its power within the system and desires the continuation of the war. On the other hand, figures like President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf seek diplomatic consensus and a ceasefire with the US to halt the economic collapse. These steps by the civilian wing are sabotaged and labeled as “normalizationist” and “traitorous” by hawks inside the IRGC, leading to a serious dual leadership structure (command-and-control confusion) in state governance. The presidency and the cabinet appear to have been reduced to a symbolic role. All of these factors are read as signs of a major governance crisis waiting to erupt post-war.
Iran’s true fear is the fear of fragmentation. In Iran, where more than fifty percent of the population consists of different ethnic groups such as Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Balochs, Arabs (Ahvazi), and Turkmen, the regime’s greatest fear is ethnic balkanization. There is constant anxiety that anti-regime demonstrations could lead to secessionist movements in Kurdish, Baloch, and Ahvazi (Arab) regions. For this reason, the secular/nationalist Persian population opposed to the regime has largely distanced itself from protests.
During a closed-door meeting with the Iranian diaspora in New York for the United Nations General Assembly in September 2024, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian issued a striking warning about division regarding internal unity and ethnic vulnerabilities. By explicitly naming ethnic regions, he said: “If, God forbid, something happens in the country, Azerbaijan becomes an independent state, Kurdistan becomes an independent state, Khuzestan another, Balochistan another… Meaning Iran will no longer exist. It turns into chaos.” These words demonstrate the scale and seriousness of the trauma.
Conclusion
Following the practical conclusion of the war or the signing of a long-term ceasefire, the Tehran administration is anxious about the probability that the public—having temporarily rallied around the leadership against an external threat—will raise economic and political demands, causing street reactions against the regime to re-emerge.
The regime operates under the absolute authority of Velayat-e Faqih, but societal adherence to religious authority is rapidly weakening. Despite Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s fatwa stating that participating in elections is a religious duty, voter turnout in the 2nd round of the recent presidential election (July 5, 2024) stood at 49.8%, with half of the population choosing not to vote and disobeying religious authority. While Masoud Pezeshkian won that election with 53.6% of the vote, Conservative Saeed Jalili, who was backed by the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards, received only 46.4% of cast votes. Representing approximately 23% of the total eligible voter population, this percentage shows that public support for the regime has fallen to roughly a quarter. The erosion of regime support, coupled with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei remaining out of sight since March, is sounding alarm bells.
Because allegations of external threats and treason will disappear once the war ends, the public may return to the streets and display their accumulated economic and political anger through far more organized, mass protests. It appears that the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, positioning themselves as guardians of the regime, are preparing to flood the streets and keep public reactions under control using the Janfada battalions they have trained and armed. If such preparations are indeed underway, pitting one segment of the public against another in the face of protests could lead to unpredictable outcomes.
[i] Basij Chief Says ‘Jan-Fada’ Volunteers Being Integrated Into Iran Defense Units
[ii] IRGC Mobilizes “Janfada” Campaign for Weapons Training and Mass Military Drills
https://iranwire.com/en/news/157628-jan-fada-campaign-calls-for-1000-military-battalions
*This article was published on sde.org.tr on September 21, 2026.